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he recent economic and financial crisis and the current slow 
recovery highlight that homeownership plays a critical role in 
the U.S. economy. The estimated “equivalent rent” implicitly 
paid by homeowners accounts for more than 8 percent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP). Investment in single-family housing also represents 
a significant share of GDP and is closely tied to the business cycle. 
Over the past decade, such investment has ranged from as little as 1.3 
percent of GDP during recessions to as much as 3.4 percent during 
expansions. The associated large fluctuations in demand for owner-
occupied housing play an important role in driving the business cycle. 
In addition, demand for owner-occupied housing is especially sensitive 
to intermediate-term real interest rates and hence to inflation and mon-
etary policy expectations.
Homeownership also plays an important role in determining 
household saving, which has implications for national saving and in-
vestment. Some aspects of homeownership increase household and na-
tional saving. For example, renters intending to purchase a home have 
an incentive to save to make a down payment on their first home. In 
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addition, new homeowners must promise to save far into the future by 
making monthly mortgage principal payments. On the other hand, 
homeownership typically requires large house-related payments and so 
can reduce household cash flows available to invest in financial assets 
such as stocks and bonds. 
For decades, conventional wisdom has viewed homeownership as 
an effective way to build household wealth. However, the recent fall 
in house prices has caused some observers to question this belief. This 
article examines whether homeownership effectively builds household 
wealth. It develops an analytical framework to compare the wealth that 
homeowners have historically accumulated by building equity in their 
houses with the wealth they could have accumulated by renting an 
identical house and investing the resulting saved cash flow in stocks 
and bonds. 
The first section describes the analytical framework. The second sec-
tion uses the framework to compare building wealth by owning and by 
renting an identical house for ten-year occupancies beginning in 1970 
through 1999. The article finds that for ten-year occupancies beginning 
during most of the 1970s and 1990s, homeowners built more wealth 
than renters. In contrast, for ten-year occupancies beginning during 
most of the 1980s, renters who invested their savings from lower house 
payments (than owners) built more wealth. For other periods (about a 
quarter of the ten year occupancies), it is unclear whether owning or 
renting built more wealth. This ambiguity arises from the difficulty of 
measuring the market rent and purchase price on identical houses.
I.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Comparing the wealth built by purchasing and building equity in 
a house with the wealth built by renting an identical house and invest-
ing any saved cash flow in stocks and bonds requires a framework that 
tracks the many cash flows associated with owning and renting. These 
flows include both one-time items, such as making a down payment on 
a house, and recurring payments, such as monthly mortgage and rent 
payments. Such a focus on cash flows is needed because the many costs, 
investments, transfers and taxes associated with owning and renting a 
house are together too complicated to allow a simpler comparison of 
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This section details the framework for this flow accounting—spe-
cifically, the framework for taking account of the many cash flows that 
affect the wealth accumulation of owners and renters. In particular, it 
describes the cash and financial flows associated with owning and rent-
ing a house, the saved cash flow that the renter can invest in stocks and 
bonds, the breakeven rent-to-price ratio at which owners and renters 
accumulate equal wealth, and the market rent-to-price ratio at which 
households can rent or purchase an identical house. Ultimately, the 
article’s assessment of the merits of ownership and renting for wealth 
accumulation will rest on the comparison of the breakeven and market 
rent-to-price ratios. 
Cash and financial flows associated with homeownership and renting
The analytical framework for comparing the wealth built from 
homeownership and renting is based on tracking the wealth accumula-
tion of two hypothetical households with identical composition and 
equal labor income. One household purchases a house, while the oth-
er rents an identical house.2 Over the course of ten-year occupancies, 
the owner household makes numerous house-related payments, and 
the renter household makes monthly rent payments.3 In addition, the 
renter regularly makes new investments in stocks and bonds. The two 
households are assumed to spend an equal amount on non-housing 
consumption. As a result, the amount the renter splits between paying 
rent and investing in stocks and bonds exactly equals the total of all 
homeowner payments.4  At the end of ten years, the owner household 
sells its house and the renter household liquidates its stock and bond 
portfolio. 
Figure 1 summarizes the main cash flows for a hypothetical home-
owner and renter.5 Just prior to moving in, the homeowner makes a 
cash down payment equal to 20 percent of the purchase price. The 
homeowner also makes some additional payments related to the house 
purchase, including the origination fee on a 30-year, fixed-rate mort-
gage for the remaining 80 percent of the house purchase price.
Thereafter, the homeowner makes a number of recurring payments 
on a monthly or annual basis. These include mortgage interest pay-
ments, which are partly offset by their tax deductibility, and payments 
for a list of sundry expenses, including maintenance, insurance, and 38  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
real estate taxes. In addition, the homeowner makes monthly mortgage 
principal payments, which build home equity. At the end of ten years, 
the owner sells his house, pays the associated selling costs, and pays off 
the outstanding mortgage balance. The remaining cash constitutes the 
owner’s final wealth.
Just prior to moving in, the renter is assumed to make an initial 
investment in stocks and bonds equal to the owner’s down payment 
plus other purchase costs. This matching of the owner’s and the renter’s 
initial payments reflects a more general requirement that, at any point 
in time, the renter’s payments on rent and investment must equal the 
homeowner’s payments on housing. As a result of this matching, any 
difference in final wealth between the owner and renter reflects the rel-
ative effectiveness of homeownership and renting in building wealth 
rather than differences in the nonhousing consumption of the home-
owner and renter.
During each of the ten years of occupancy, the renter pays an annual 
rent, which increases at the national rate of rent inflation. The renter 
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rent and new investments equals the sum of the homeowner’s annual 
payments. At the end of ten years, the renter liquidates his stock and 
bond portfolio and pays any taxes due. The remainder constitutes the 
renter’s final wealth.
Renter saved cash flow
Typically, annual homeownership payments considerably exceed 
annual rent. It is helpful to think of this excess as “saved” cash flow that 
the renter does not have to spend on housing. The renter is assumed 
to invest all saved cash flow in stocks and bonds. In other words, he 
does not use any saved cash flow to increase his nonhousing consump-
tion. As an accounting identity, saved cash flow equals homeowner 
payments less rent. Thus, any increase in rent (holding homeowner 
payments constant) implies that saved cash flow and hence renter new 
investment must fall by an offsetting amount. As a result, the renter’s 
final wealth also falls. Conversely, any increase in the homeowner’s pay-
ments (holding rent constant) implies higher saved cash flow and hence 
higher renter new investment. As a result, the renter’s final wealth also 
increases. 
Breakeven rent-to-price ratio
A key concept in the analysis is the breakeven rent-to-price ratio. 
This is simply the rent at the beginning of an occupancy for a given 
house purchase price that equalizes the owner’s and the renter’s final 
wealth. A low breakeven ratio indicates that homeownership is likely to 
be the more effective means of building wealth, and a high ratio indi-
cates that renting is likely to be more effective.
To match a given final wealth of the homeowner, the renter must 
have a certain level of saved cash flow each year to invest in stocks and 
bonds. The exact amount depends primarily on stock and bond returns 
and tax considerations. The required saved cash flow in turn determines 
the initial-period rent that equalizes homeowner and renter wealth. The 
higher the required cashflow, the lower the monthly rent that a renter 
can afford to pay. Almost all underlying calculations depend on the ratio 
of rent-to-house price but do not otherwise depend on either the rent or 
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Many factors determine the breakeven rent-to-price ratio. Broadly, 
these factors fall into three main categories: 1) homeowner payments, 
2) renter financial returns, and 3) home price appreciation (Table 1). 
As already described, homeowner payments are a main determinant 
of renter saved cash flow. In turn, renter saved cash flow determines 
renter new investment and final wealth. In contrast, homeowner pay-
ments, other than for mortgage principal, do not affect homeowner fi-
nal wealth.7 Thus, the increase in renter saved cash flow implied by an 
increase in homeowner payments must be offset by an equal rise in rent, 
thereby restoring renter saved cash flow and final wealth to their origi-
nal levels. In addition, the tax savings associated with homeownership is 
an important offset to homeowner payments and helps determine the 
breakeven ratio (box). 
The breakeven rent-to-price ratio also depends on renter after-tax 
financial returns to investment, specifically the returns on stocks and 
bonds and the taxation of capital income. For example, an increased rate 
of return or a reduced tax rate will lead to higher renter final wealth. In 
this case, equalizing renter and homeowner final wealth requires renter 
saved cash flow and new investment to come down. An increase in the 
breakeven ratio accomplishes this.
Table 1
MAIN DETERMINANTS OF THE BREAKEVEN RENT-TO- 
PRICE RATIO
Determinant Channel Effect on breakeven ratio
1. Higher mortgage origination cost
2. Higher mortgage interest rates
3. Higher maintenance payments
4. Higher insurance rates
5. Lower tax subsidies (see box)
6. Lower rent inflation
Increase renter saved cash flow 
and new investment
Increases. Breakeven rent-to-price 
ratio must increase to bring saved 
cash flow back down.
1. Higher stock and bond returns
2. Lower taxation of capital income 
and capital gains
Increase after-tax renter financial 
returns and so renter final wealth
Increases. Breakeven rent-to-price 
ratio must increase to bring down 
saved cash flow and so bring down 
renter final wealth.
1. Higher house price appreciation Increase owner final wealth for a 
given rate of house payments
Decreases. Breakeven rent-to-
price ratio must decrease to boost 
renter saved cash flow and new 
investment.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  41
HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX SAVINGS
Saved taxes are an important determinant of the breakeven 
rent-to-price ratio. In general, the tax deductability of mortgage 
interest payments lowers homeowner taxes and cash outflows, 
thereby decreasing renter saved cash flow. As a result, the attrac-
tiveness of homeownership relative to renting increases, requiring 
the breakeven rent-to-price ratio to fall. 
The average amount by which each dollar of interest deducted 
reduces homeowner taxes is directly proportional to a household’s 
marginal tax rate and to the amount by which total itemized de-
ductions exceed the standard deduction. The dependence on the 
marginal rate is straightforward. For each dollar deducted from 
taxable income, the actual reduction in taxes paid is the marginal 
rate. Average homeowner tax benefits depend on the excess of to-
tal deductions (both for homeownership and non-homeownership 
reasons) over the standard deduction. Only these excess deductions 
actually lower a homeowner’s tax bill. Larger total deductions fol-
low from a larger mortgage (due to a more expensive house or a 
smaller down payment), a higher mortgage interest rate, or higher 
non-housing deductions. 
The dependence of the subsidy on non-housing deductions, 
such as for state and local taxes and for charitable contributions, 
arises because non-housing deductions are typically smaller than 
the standard deduction. In contrast, homeownership deductions 
typically exceed the standard deduction and so make it profitable 
to take non-housing deductions. Homeownership thus gets “cred-
it” for the associated tax savings.
More generally, differences in the tax subsidy to homeownership 
can arise for a myriad of reasons, including changes in federal tax 
code, differences in tax codes across states and localities, differences 
in non-housing deductions, and differences in household income.42  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Lastly, the rate of house price appreciation is an obvious determi-
nant of the breakeven rent-to-price ratio. Faster appreciation increases 
homeowner final wealth. To match it, renter new investments in stocks 
and bonds must increase. Doing so requires larger saved cash flow and 
thus a lower breakeven rent-to-price ratio. Conversely, slower house 
price appreciation requires lower renter saved cash flow to equalize final 
wealth and hence a higher rent-to-price ratio.
Market rent-to-price ratio
To determine whether ownership or renting builds more wealth, 
the breakeven rent-to-price ratio can be compared to a market rent-
to-price ratio. This market ratio measures the rent relative to the pur-
chase price of identical houses. When the market ratio falls below the 
breakeven ratio, rents are inexpensive relative to purchase prices, which 
allows renting to build more wealth. Conversely, when the market ratio 
rises above the breakeven ratio, rents are expensive relative to purchase 
prices, and so homeownership builds more wealth.
However, the comparison of breakeven and market ratios is com-
plicated by some measurement limitations. Accurately estimating the 
market rent-to-price ratio is extremely difficult (see Appendix 2). The 
challenge is that no two houses are identical. In practice, it is necessary 
to use statistical estimates of rent values for owner-occupied houses and 
of purchase prices for renter-occupied houses. Unfortunately, such es-
timates are typically biased by failing to account for numerous house 
attributes for which information is not readily available. 
Because of these measurement challenges, the present analysis relies 
on ranges of plausible values for the market rent-to-price ratio, rather 
than on specific estimates. Many potential market ratios are simply too 
low or too high to be plausible. For example, a potential market rent 
that far exceeds homeownership cash outflows would cause all house-
holds to purchase a house. Of course, this would be counterfactual, 
making such a high market ratio implausible. 
The breakeven rent-to-price ratio is compared to two ranges, which 
can reasonably be expected to include all plausible market rent-to-price 
ratios. The first, broader range runs from 500 to 1,000 (all market and 
breakeven rent-to-price ratios will be expressed as monthly rent per 
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fixed from 1970 to 1999, is the approximate average ratio of median 
rent to median owner-estimated purchase price as reported in various 
Census Bureau surveys from 1970 through 2008.9 As described in Ap-
pendix 2, unobserved house characteristics and upward-biased valua-
tions by owners suggest that the true market rent-to-price ratio will 
be higher than 500. The upper bound of 1,000 is also assumed to be 
fixed from 1970 to 1999. One thousand is consistent with the highest 
average rent-to-price ratio found in a 20-year study that asked renters 
and homeowners to estimate the dollar amounts at which the house 
they lived in could be rented out and the price at which it could be sold 
(Garner and Verbrugge).10
Estimates of the growth rate of the market rent-to-price ratio sug-
gest a narrower range of plausible market ratios. The growth rate of the 
market ratio, unlike its level, can be estimated with some accuracy. It 
simply equals the growth of rents minus the growth of house prices, 
and reasonable estimates exist for both.11 The upper and lower bounds 
on plausibility should grow at the same rate at which the actual market 
ratio grows.12 A time-varying upper bound on plausible market ratios 
can therefore be constructed as the highest time path that grows at the 
market ratio rate without exceeding 1,000 (Chart 1). Similarly, a time-
varying lower bound on plausible market ratios can be constructed as 
the lowest time path that grows at the market ratio rate without falling 
below 500. 
II.  HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Based on the analytical framework just described and historical 
data, this section compares the wealth built by homeownership and 
renting for ten-year occupancies beginning in 1970 through 1999. Spe-
cifically, it constructs breakeven rent-to-price ratios for each of these 
initial years and then compares them to the fixed and time-varying, 
market-based ranges described in the previous section. Last, the section 
calculates the differences in final wealth between renting and owning 
when the market and breakeven ratios differed.
Historical breakeven ratios
The initial-period rent-to-price ratio that equated the final wealth 
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THE RISKS OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
For tractability, the article’s analysis makes a number of sim-
plifying assumptions. These include: all house prices grew at the 
ex-post, nationally representative rate; all households stayed in 
their houses for exactly ten years; and all households and houses 
experienced no idiosyncratic events. Each of these assumptions ob-
scures some significant risks. In particular, homeowners are subject 
to at least three overlapping types of risk: price risk, house risk, 
and household risk. Together such risks are substantial, which im-
plies that the estimated breakeven rent-to-price ratios may be too 
low. More specifically, negative events falling into one or more of 
these risk categories may increase homeowner cash outflows and 
decrease homeowner final wealth. Taking account of this possibil-
ity, a household would favor renting over owning at the breakeven 
rent-to-price ratio calculated in the main text. To restore indiffer-
ence requires the breakeven rent-to-price ratio to rise.
The price risk associated with homeownership has several 
components. The first is the large variation over time and across 
locations in average home price appreciation. Price appreciation 
can even differ substantially across neighboring houses. The final 
wealth impact of the underlying house price swings are magnified 
by leverage. For example, a moderate price decline on a house can 
wipe out a homeowner’s equity. Lack of diversification further com-
pounds price risk. For more than half of all homeowners, home 
equity accounts for at least two-thirds of household wealth (Sinai 
and Souleles 2009). A final component of homeownership’s price 
risk is illiquidity. Selling a house takes time. To quickly access ac-
cumulated equity, a homeowner may be forced to accept a steep 
price discount.
The second category of homeownership risk concerns the spe-
cific house itself. Numerous events can affect the consumption value 
that flows from a house. While such events typically cause price 
changes and so also fall into the price risk category, they separately 
affect a homeowner’s welfare as well. For example, serious damage 
to a house will likely require significant homeowner time and en-46  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ergy, regardless of any monetary costs the homeowner must bear. 
As another example, changes in the character of a neighborhood or 
metro area—such as to public school quality or crime—will affect 
homeowners’ welfare directly, in addition to affecting house values. 
The third category of homeownership risk concerns house-
holds themselves. It is common for a household to need to move 
unexpectedly. Shorter stays imply fewer years over which to amor-
tize buying, selling, and any refinancing costs.
Of course, renting also poses significant risks. Renters face 
unknown future rents. Rents that increase rapidly will decrease 
renter wealth and so make homeownership relatively more attrac-
tive (Sinai and Souleles 2005). Real returns on stocks and bonds, 
the primary savings alternatives to homeownership, are uncertain. 
In addition, some of the risks to homeownership just described 
also apply to renters. A decline in neighborhood quality affects the 
welfare of all local residents. But an important difference between 
owners and renters is that it is typically far less costly for a renter to 
move in response to a change in neighborhood quality.
A final point is that the identified risks also can yield posi-
tive surprises. For example, crime may go down or public school 
quality may improve. But substantial economic research finds that 
people are “risk averse”: they prefer no surprises to the possibility 
of either a negative or a positive surprise. The more risk averse a 
household is, the higher the rent-to-price ratio must be to make it 
indifferent between renting and buying.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  47
renters investing saved cash flow in bonds, rising mortgage interest rates 
pushed up the breakeven rent-to-price ratio from just 100 (monthly 
rent per $100,000 purchase price) in 1970 to above 600 for most of 
the 1980s (Chart 2).13 This increase in the bond-based breakeven ratio 
suggests that homeownership went from being a very effective way to 
build wealth during the early 1970s to a considerably less effective way 
during the 1980s. Falling mortgage interest rates and accelerating house 
appreciation pushed the bond-based breakeven ratio back below 200 by 
the mid-1990s, after which it began rising again.
Based on renters investing saved cash flow in stocks, the break-
even ratio varied even more widely.14 Rising mortgage interest rates and 
returns from investing in stocks pushed the breakeven ratio up from 
about 200 in the early 1970s to above 800 for the entire 1980s (Chart 
2, black line). Falling mortgage interest rates and stock returns, along 
with accelerating house appreciation, pushed the stock-based breakev-
en ratio down sharply during the early and mid-1990s.15
The rise in breakeven rent-to-price ratios that began in the late 
1990s was driven primarily by the large contraction of house prices 
from 2007 to 2009.16  The ten-year occupancy that began in 1996 was 
the last to end prior to the price contraction. During this occupancy, 
prices appreciated every year. Consequently, houses purchased in 1996 
had cumulative real price increases of almost 60 percent. In contrast, 
houses purchased three years later, in 1999, experienced just seven years 
of strong price appreciation, followed by three years of contraction. The 
corresponding cumulative real price increase was under 20 percent.17
Breakeven rent-to-price ratios are likely to continue to rise through 
occupancies beginning in 2006. Hence, homeownership will continue 
losing its effectiveness as a way to build wealth. This expectation is pre-
mised on house prices continuing to contract in 2010 and then stabiliz-
ing at their late 2010 level.18 If this assumption proves correct, ten-year 
rates of price appreciation on houses purchased in 2000 through 2006 
will continue to fall. Regardless of purchase year, these houses will have 
experienced four years of falling prices. But as the year of purchase ad-
vances, they will have experienced fewer of the preceding boom years. 
Lower house price appreciation, in turn, allows renter households to 
afford higher rents while matching dampened homeowner final wealth. 
Equivalently, lower house price appreciation implies an increase in the 48  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
breakeven rent-to-price ratio, reflecting that homeownership has be-
come a relatively less effective way to build wealth.19 
Breakeven rent-to-price ratios for occupancies beginning in 2006 
through 2010 will also be driven by the recent price contraction, only 
in the opposite direction. Advancing through these five purchase years, 
the number of years of price decline that will have been experienced 
will fall from four to zero assuming that prices indeed fall in 2010 and 
stabilize thereafter. The decrease in the number of years of price con-
traction will put downward pressure on the breakeven ratio. In other 
words, during these purchase years homeownership may become a 
more effective way to build household wealth (although not necessarily 
more effective than renting).
Of course, at some point house prices will start appreciating again. 
This appreciation will put downward pressure on the breakeven ratio 
for occupancies that began as many as ten years earlier. For example, 
house prices that begin appreciating again in 2011 would put down-
ward pressure on the breakeven ratio for years 2001 through 2010.20 
Complementing a possible fall in the breakeven ratio is that the 
market ratio rose sharply from 2006 to 2010. This simply reflects the 
fall in house prices over the years. 
Hence the breakeven ratio need not be as low as in the past for 
homeownership to be the more effective way to build household wealth. 
Comparing breakeven and market rent-to-price ratios
To determine whether renting or purchasing a house built more 
wealth over a given ten-year occupancy, the historical breakeven rent-
to-price ratios just described can be compared to the two plausible 
ranges of the market rent-to-price ratio introduced in the previous sec-
tion. As a first pass, the historical breakeven ratios will be compared to 
the broader plausible range, characterized by a fixed lower bound of 
500 and a fixed upper bound of 1,000. The ratios will then be com-
pared to a plausible range based on time-varying bounds.
For initial years of occupancy in which the breakeven ratio fell 
below the lower bound of the plausible market range, owning unam-
biguously built more wealth than renting. In this case, the rent (for a 
given house price) a renter could afford while still matching a home-
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the breakeven ratio exceeded the upper bound of the plausible market 
range, renting unambiguously built more wealth than homeownership. 
In this case, the highest plausible market rent-to-price ratio fell below 
what a renter could afford to pay while still matching a homeowner’s 
final wealth. For many occupancies, the breakeven ratio fell between the 
lower and upper bounds of the plausible market range. In this case, it is 
ambiguous whether the breakeven ratio or the actual market ratio was 
higher. Hence it is not clear whether renting or homeownership built 
more wealth.
The first period during which homeownership unambiguously 
built more wealth than renting was during the early and mid-1970s. 
For ten-year occupancies beginning in 1970 through 1976, both the 
bond-based and stock-based breakeven ratios remained below the lower 
bound of plausible market ratios (Chart 3, dashed and solid blue lines 
versus dashed black line). Households that purchased a house during 
these years unambiguously built more wealth than renters, regardless of 
renters’ choices of where to invest. In addition, the bond-based breakev-
en ratios remained below the plausible lower bound in 1977 and 1978. 
Households that purchased a house in these years unambiguously built 
Chart 3
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more wealth than a household that rented an identical house and in-
vested the saved cash flow in bonds. However, the stock-based break-
even ratio in these two years was above the lower bound of the plausible 
range of market ratios. Hence it is possible that either purchasing a 
home in 1977-78 or renting one and investing the saved cash flow in 
stocks would have built more wealth.21
 For ten-year occupancies beginning in the late 1970s through the 
early 1990s, both the bond-based and stock-based breakeven ratios re-
mained within the broad range of plausible market ratios defined by the 
fixed 500 and 1,000 bounds. Hence, using this broad range of plausi-
bility, it is not possible to say with certainty whether renting or home-
ownership built more wealth. For several of years during the 1980s, 
however, the breakeven ratio rose very close to the upper bound on 
plausibility. For occupancies beginning in such years, it is likely that 
the actual market rent-to-price ratio, as opposed to the plausible range, 
was below the breakeven ratio, implying that renting built more wealth 
than homeownership.
 Homeownership again unambiguously built more wealth than did 
renting for ten-year occupancies beginning during most of the 1990s. 
The bond-based breakeven rent-to-price ratio fell below the 500 lower 
bound for occupancies beginning in 1991; the stock-based breakeven 
ratio fell below it for occupancies beginning in 1993. Both breakevens 
remained below the 500 lower bound through at least 1999. Of course, 
it is not surprising that homeownership built more wealth than renting 
for occupancies that coincided with a period of very fast house price 
appreciation.22
In contrast, homeowners who began their ten-year occupancies 
from 2000 through 2006 will experience at least four years of falling 
prices. If, as assumed above, prices stabilize at their 2010 level, the 
number of positive appreciation years experienced during these occu-
pancies will fall from five to zero. As a result, the breakeven ratio for 
at least the more recent of these years is likely to be sufficiently high 
to make renting the more effective way to build household wealth. 
On the other hand, if significant house price appreciation resumes in 
2011 or shortly thereafter, the rise in the breakeven ratio will be at 
least partly tempered.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  51
Chart 4
TIME-VARYING PLAUSIBLE MARKET
VS BREAKEVEN RENT-TO-PRICE RATIOS
Sources: See technical appendix
Comparing breakeven ratios with the time-varying range of market ratios
As described in the first section, reasonably estimated changes in 
rents and house prices imply changes over time in the market rent-to-
price ratio, whatever its initial level.23 Taking account of these changes 
yields narrower, time-varying bounds on the market rent-to-price ratio.
The main difference from using the narrower plausible range of 
market ratios as a basis of comparison is that from 1980-82 and again 
from 1987-1990 the stock-based breakeven ratio (Chart 4, blue line) 
lies above the time-varying upper bound (Chart 4, black dotted line), 
rather than slightly below it. Hence, renting unambiguously built more 
wealth than owning for occupancies beginning in these years. In addi-
tion, the stock based breakeven ratio lies almost but not quite above the 
plausible upper bound for occupancies beginning in 1983-86. Hence, 
renting in these years probably built more wealth than owning, al-
though this is not unambiguously the case.
Overall, then, homeownership unambiguously built more wealth 
than renting and investing in either stocks or bonds for slightly more 
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These were primarily during the early and mid-1970s and most of the 
1990s. Renting and investing in stocks unambiguously built more 
wealth than owning for one quarter of these ten-year occupancies, all 
during the 1980s. For the remaining quarter of the occupancies, either 
homeownership or renting and investing may have built more wealth, 
although for several of these years during the 1980s, renting was con-
siderably more likely to have done so. 
For many of the ten-year occupancies currently underway, it is likely 
that renting will prove to have unambiguously built more wealth than 
owning. The breakeven ratio is likely to rise sharply through occupan-
cies beginning in 2006. Complementing this rise in the breakeven ratio 
is that the run-up of house prices relative to rents through 2006 pushed 
the time-varying upper bound on plausibility downward, from just un-
der 800 in 1999 to approximately 600 in 2005-07. An upper bound on 
the plausible market rent-to-price ratio of 600 would have doubled the 
number of occupancies beginning in 1970-1999 for which renting and 
investing saved cash flow built more wealth than homeownership.
The payoff from choosing between renting and owning
To this point, the analysis has focused on determining whether 
renting or owning a house built more wealth over a succession of ten-
year occupancies. But how large was the wealth gain or loss from choos-
ing one tenure type rather than the other? Did choosing “correctly” 
yield a sizable difference in wealth?
The answer is clearly “yes” for most years. When the rent-to-price ratio 
differed from the breakeven ratio, the difference in final wealth between 
renting and purchasing was typically quite large. For example, when the 
market ratio was 10 percent above the bond-based breakeven ratio, rent-
ing and investing in bonds would have resulted on average across ten-year 
occupancies in final wealth that was 12 percent lower than a homeowner’s 
final wealth. When the market ratio was 10 percent lower than the bond-
based breakeven ratio, renting and investing in bonds resulted, on aver-
age, in final wealth 12 percent higher than a homeowner’s final wealth. 
Across ten-year occupancies, the corresponding differences in final wealth 
ranged from 2 to 26 percent. 
For stock-based breakeven ratios, a 10 percent difference with the 
market ratio would have caused an average final wealth difference of 24 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  53
percent. The corresponding range across ten-year occupancies was 2 to 
62 percent.24 These wealth differences scale proportionally to alternative 
percent differences between the breakeven and market rent-to-price ratios.
Of course, this large payoff is based on hindsight. While a cur-
rent year’s market rent-to-price ratio is based on current information, 
a current year’s breakeven rent-to-price ratio is based on numerous un-
knowns, including house prices, stock prices, bond prices, mortgage 
interest rates, and the tax code over the subsequent ten years.
III.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Conventional wisdom has long suggested that homeownership is 
an effective way to build household wealth. Consistent with this belief, 
homeownership is often considered to be a key part of the American 
Dream. Yet, the loss of a house to foreclosure recently experienced by 
millions of U.S. households, along with the sharp declines in wealth 
experienced by virtually all U.S. homeowners, would seem to make a 
reconsideration of homeownership inevitable. 
The analysis in this article shows that while homeownership often 
builds more household wealth than renting and investing the saved cash 
flow, it also often does not. More specifically, for most ten-year occupan-
cies beginning during the 1970s and 1990s, homeownership unambigu-
ously built more wealth. In contrast, for most occupancies beginning dur-
ing the 1980s, renting and investing unambiguously built more wealth. 
Renting and investing is also likely to build more wealth than homeown-
ership for many of the occupancies that started in 2000 through 2009.
These results suggest that either homeownership or renting and 
investing can be reasonable strategies for building household wealth. 
In other words, the conventional wisdom that homeownership is usu-
ally the better strategy is probably too strong. For many households in 
many years, renting and investing the saved cash flow has built more 
wealth than homeownership. On the other hand, about half of the time, 
homeownership has built more wealth than renting. Moreover, it may 
be easier to purchase than to rent a house that closely matches a house-
hold’s unique tastes. Put differently, identical houses are typically not 
available both to rent and to purchase.
A more balanced view of the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of homeownership could have important macroeconomic implica-54  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
tions. On the one hand, demand may shift away from single-family 
houses and delay the recovery of single-family construction. On the 
other hand, a demand shift away from homeownership might increase 
household savings invested in stocks, bonds, and other financial securi-
ties. This, in turn, would likely contribute to lower intermediate- and 
long-term interest rates, stimulating business investment and increas-
ing the economy’s nonresidential productive capacity. Finally, while a 
more balanced view of homeownership would likely increase the share 
of households living in multifamily homes, it would also increase the 
affordability of many other things that households consume. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  55
APPENDIX 1
THE CONSUMPTION VALUE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
The analysis in the text of whether renting or homeownership built 
more wealth implicitly focused on homeownership’s investment benefit. 
Homeownership’s other main benefit, having a place to live in and enjoy, 
was removed from the analysis by assuming that owners and renters lived 
in identical houses and so received the same consumption benefit.
This appendix compares the relative size of homeownership’s con-
sumption and investment benefits. Specifically, it compares the con-
sumption value of living in a house for a ten-year occupancy against 
the net proceeds from selling the house at the end of that occupancy. 
Homeownership’s cash outflows, which are used to “purchase” the con-
sumption and investment benefits, do not enter into the calculations 
of the benefits in this appendix. Hence these benefits can be consid-
ered gross of costs. The estimates indicate that, for ten-year occupan-
cies beginning in 1970 through 1999, homeownership’s consumption 
benefit typically far exceeded homeownership’s investment benefit. In 
other words, homeownership’s large cash outflows primarily purchased 
consumption rather than investment. 
Investment benefit
As just described, the investment benefit to homeownership is the 
net proceeds from selling the house. These proceeds are discounted 
back to the time of the house purchase using the after-tax, one-year 
Treasury bill rates that applied over the ten-year occupancy. The result 
equals the investment in one-year Treasury bills at the time of purchase 
that over ten years would grow, if continually reinvested after paying 
taxes on interest, to the net proceeds from the sale of the house.
Homeownership’s investment benefit has varied widely over time. 
The most important underlying determinant is the rate of house price 
appreciation. Correspondingly, the investment benefit—measured 
relative to a house’s purchase price—was highest for occupancies be-
ginning in the early 1970s and mid 1990s (Chart 5, solid blue line). 
During both periods, the investment benefit rose above $70,000 (per 
$100,000 purchase price). Conversely, the investment benefit was espe-
cially low for occupancies beginning during the 1980s, remaining close 56  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
to $30,000 for the entire decade. Averaged across all 29 years of initial 
purchase, the investment benefit was $46,500. 
Consumption benefit
 The consumption benefit depends on the market rent-to-price ra-
tio and so cannot be estimated precisely. Like the market ratio, it is 
instead best described by a range of plausible values. In addition, the 
consumption benefit “flows” continuously over a ten-year occupancy. 
In practice, this consumption flow is assumed to take place at a limited 
number of points in time and then discounted from each of these back 
to the time of purchase.
The flow of homeownership’s consumption benefit—that is, hav-
ing a place to live in and enjoy—is naturally valued by the market rent 
that would have to be paid to live in an identical house. Such a rent 
relative to the identical house’s purchase price is exactly the market 
rent-to-price ratio discussed in the main text. Because the market ratio 
is known only up to a plausible range, homeownership’s consumption 
benefit valuation can only be calculated to a plausible range as well.
The consumption benefit flows that correspond to purchasing a 
house at the lower-and upper-bound plausable market ratios can be dis-
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rates. The results equal the lower-bound and upper-bound investments 
in one-year Treasury bills at the time of purchase that, if continually 
reinvested, would pay, year by year, the lowest and highest plausible 
market rent for the owned house.
The range of plausible consumption benefit valuations turns out 
to be relatively wide. Comparing the dotted and dashed black lines 
in Chart 5 shows that the upper-bound valuation exceeded the lower 
bound by an average of $32,000 (per $100,000 purchase price). Even 
so, the lower-bound consumption benefit typically exceeded the invest-
ment benefit by a wide margin (Chart 5, dashed black line versus solid 
blue line). On average across years, the margin was almost 50 percent. 
The upper-bound consumption benefit valuation always far ex-
ceeded the investment benefit (Chart 5, dotted black line versus solid 
blue line). Even for the occupancies in which investment benefits were 
highest, the upper-bound consumption benefit was at least 25 percent 
higher. For occupancies with a below-average investment benefit, the 
upper-bound consumption benefit was as much as three times higher.
Homeownership, at least until recently, was often described as a 
great investment that also includes a place to live. More accurately, 
homeownership should have been described as a place to live that also 
includes an expected investment benefit. This shift in emphasis applies 
not only to homeownership occupancies that coincided with the recent 
sharp price contraction. Even for ten-year occupancies that ended prior 
to the contraction, homeownership’s principle benefit has almost al-
ways been having a place to live in and enjoy. For ten-year occupancies 
currently underway, this is likely to be even more the case.58  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX 2
ESTIMATING THE MARKET RENT-TO-PRICE RATIO
Estimates of market rent-to-price ratios are typically based on sta-
tistical estimates of rent values for owner-occupied houses and of pur-
chase prices for renter-occupied houses. Such estimates are based on 
shared attributes between very large samples of both types of houses. 
The measured attributes available to make statistical estimates, 
however, typically miss many important determinants of rents and pur-
chase prices. Examples of such “unobserved” attributes include numer-
ous characteristics of a house itself, such as square footage, state of re-
pair, and aesthetic appeal; the location characteristics of a house’s plot, 
such as adjacent traffic, noise, and scenic views; and the characteristics 
of a house’s neighborhood, such as property taxes, public school qual-
ity, and crime. These unobserved attributes tend to be more desirable 
for owner-occupied houses and so cause estimates of the market rent-
to-price ratio to be understated. In other words, a rented house that 
appears statistically identical to an owner-occupied house is often less 
desirable. Reasons why unobserved attributes may be more desirable 
include the typically higher income of owners and the fact that they 
have more incentive to keep their house in good repair.
Understated estimates of the market rent-to-price ratio, in turn, 
exaggerate the saved cash flows that renters can invest in stocks and 
bonds, thus overstating a renters’ final wealth. Correcting for this bias 
would increase the chances that the market rent-to-price ratio is above 
the breakeven ratio, in which case owning would build more wealth 
than renting.
The difficulty in estimating market rents on owner-occupied 
houses and market purchase prices on rented houses is approximate-
ly matched by the difficulty in estimating market purchase prices of 
owner-occupied houses. Estimated owner-occupied market prices are 
often based on homeowners’ self-assessments. Research suggests that 
owners tend to overestimate their house’s market price, thereby bias-
ing downward estimates of the market rent-to-price ratio (Ihlanfeldt 
and Martinez-Vazquez ; Goodman and Ittner). Similar to the case of 
underestimated rents, correcting for overestimated market house prices 
would increase the chances that the correctly measured market rent-to-ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  59
price ratio is above the breakeven ratio, in which case owning would 
build more wealth than renting. Equivalently, purchasing a house may 
be less expensive than estimated and so, more attractive.60  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1In theory, a net present value comparison could be applied to the same cash 
flows tracked in the analysis. The considerable challenge would be to choose an 
appropriate discount rate. As the opportunity cost of funds varies over the years, 
the discount rate would have to vary as well. It would also have to account for 
taxes, which affect the opportunity cost of funds. An additional complication 
is that taxes depend on household characteristics, in particular on a household’s 
tax bracket, which in turn depends on investment income. The main benefit of 
comparing the final wealth between owners and renters, which is the basis for 
the  analysis, is that discounting is not required. Instead, after-tax rates of return 
implicitly discount flows to the end of each ten-year occupancy.
2The requirement that the houses are identical is meant to imply that the 
two households’ “consumption” of housing is equal. Appendix 1 compares the 
consumption benefits of homeownership to its pure investment benefits. How-
ever, the consumption value of living in a house may also depend on whether a 
household rents or owns it. For example, homeowners may enjoy homeownership 
tasks such as home maintenance and gardening, or homeowners may take pride in 
owning their home. Alternatively, the considerable time requirements associated 
with homeownership can be interpreted as lowering housing consumption. 
3Ten years is a rough estimate of the average time that a household lives in a 
house after purchasing it. Generally accepted estimates on the expected stay of new 
home buyers do not exist. The average stay among home sellers is seven years (Na-
tional Association of Realtors). But sellers are a self-selected group with a shorter-
than-average expected duration of occupancy. Hence, the expected stay across all 
new buyers will be somewhat longer than seven years. A ten-year horizon represents a 
rounding up from the seller average stay to an easily recognized time horizon.
4This equality of rent plus new investment with the sum of homeownership 
payments requires that the renter reinvest all dividends and interest payments net 
of taxes.
5Figure 1 and the associated description of owner and renter wealth building 
by necessity leave out many important details. A more comprehensive description 
is included in the technical appendix, which is available online.
6An important exception is that tax considerations can make the breakeven 
rent-to-price ratio depend on the purchase price level. As explained in the accompa-
nying box, homeowners’ tax savings are proportional to the excess of total itemized 
deductions above the standard deduction. The higher an initial mortgage, the higher 
is the share of homeowner deductions that are above the standard deduction. 
7Homeowner payments, including for principal, can be thought of as the 
“cost” of achieving homeowner final wealth. In other words, final wealth is a gross 
rather than a net benefit.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  61
8Like the breakeven ratio, the market rent-to-price ratio for any year does not 
depend on the broad price level. Hence the market ratio is comparable across years.
9All prices are for single-family, detached houses with three bedrooms, as 
reported in the 1970 through 2000 decennial censuses and the 2008 American 
Community Survey. Three is the median number of bedrooms among owner-
occupied, single-family detached houses on no more than ten acres of land. The 
ratio of median monthly contract rent—which includes utility expenses for some 
units but not all—to median owner-estimated purchase price (adjusted to be 
measured in terms of monthly rent per $100,000 purchase price) ranged from 
444 to 532 across the various decennial censuses and the 2008 American Com-
munity Survey. The likelihood that the houses on which rent were paid had, on 
average, less desirable unobserved attributes than owner-occupied houses implies 
that the rent-to-price ratio on an identical unit would be above this. At least partly 
offsetting this is that a complete exclusion of utility expenses from contract rent 
would push the market rent to price ratio lower. Consistent with a lower bound 
of 500, a recent study that used statistical techniques to control for variations in 
observed attributes estimated a rent-to-price ratio between 375 and 500 (Davis, 
Lehnert, and Martin). The study did not control for unobserved attributes and so 
the actual rent-to-price ratio is likely to be higher. 
10Such price and rent valuations were on the same house and thus unob-
served attributes were held constant. The study, jointly conducted by the Census 
Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, ran from 1982 to 2002 in five large 
metro areas: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, and Philadelphia. Hous-
ton’s estimated price-to-rent ratio, which was consistently the highest among the 
five metro ratios, usually remained above 850. During the early 1990s, it rose to 
approximately 1,000. A different study, consistent with an upper bound of 1,000, 
was conducted in 1974 by the American Council of Life Insurance. Based on 
estimated prices and rents of 43,000 properties, it found an average rent-to-price 
ratio of 987 (Peiser and Smith).
11Specifically, the growth of rent for houses similar in characteristics to own-
er-occupied houses is measured the owner equivalent rent (OER) component 
of the consumer price index. Growth of house prices is measured by several re-
spected “repeat sales” house price indexes. These estimated rent and price changes 
are “constant quality” in the sense that they are based on changes over time of the 
rent or sales price of the same house.
12Suppose the highest plausible rent-to-price ratio for a year is 1,000 and 
that the actual market ratio subsequently grows. The upper-bound plausible ratio 
must increase as well. Otherwise, if the actual market ratio were indeed at its 
upper bound prior to the growth, the actual rent-to-price market ratio would 
become implausible, which is a contradiction. 
13The bond-based breakeven rent-to-price ratios are based on investments in 
one-year Treasury bills that are continually rolled over after paying taxes on interest. 62  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
14Stock capital appreciation and dividends are assumed to be the same as 
for the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. Capital gains taxes are assumed to be 
paid annually. This biases downward the stock-based breakeven rent-to-price ra-
tio relative to paying capital gains taxes only at the end of a ten-year occupancy. 
Offsetting this bias is the exclusion of state and local income taxes in the current 
calculation. In many states, mortgage interest can be deducted from taxable in-
come. In addition, a renter’s interest, dividend, and capital gains are often subject 
to state and local income taxes. In both cases, state and local taxes increase the 
relative attractiveness of homeownership.
15For better intuition on magnitudes, the breakeven rent-to-price ratio can 
be converted to the threshold rent on a baseline quality house (rather than the 
breakeven rent on a $100,000 house). For example, the baseline quality might 
be assumed to be that of a representative house with median price in 2000. This 
median price can be deflated, using the total and owner equivalent rent CPI 
indexes, to give the real price of a similar house in other years. Adjusting the 
breakeven rent-to-price ratios discussed in the main text to correspond to this real 
baseline-quality purchase price gives the threshold rent that equates final wealth 
between purchasing and renting a baseline-quality house. During the early 1970s, 
real threshold rents on such a baseline house ranged from $125 (bond-based) to 
$275 (stock-based, 2009 dollars). As is intuitive, these threshold rents are quite 
low. During the 1980s, in contrast, the stock-based threshold rent stayed above 
$1,000, which is quite high. During most of the 1990s, threshold rents remained 
below $600 and in some years dropped as low as $200.
16Separately, the decrease in the stock-based breakeven ratio below the bond-
based one in the late 1990s stems in part from financial swings associated with 
the 2001 and 2007-09 recessions. In particular, the S&P 500 contracted by just 
over a third from 2000 to 2002, following a strong run-up the previous five years. 
It then contracted by 40 percent in 2008, a third of which was recovered the 
subsequent year. As discussed in the text, weak returns on investments cause the 
breakeven ratio to rise. 
17The S&P/Case-Shiller National Home Price Index estimates that house 
price swings were somewhat wider than the house price swings estimated by the 
Freddie Mac Repeat Sales House Price Index used in the analysis. For example, 
Case-Shiller estimates cumulative real house price appreciation for the ten-year 
occupancy that began in 1996 to be 80 percent rather than 57 percent. It esti-
mates cumulative real appreciation for the ten-year occupancy starting in 1999 
to be 7 percent rather than 18 percent. Hence the 1996-99 rise in the breakeven 
ratio calculated using the Case-Shiller index would be considerably larger and 
steeper than the rise shown in Chart 2. Correspondingly, the increase in the rela-
tive attractiveness of renting compared to homeownership over these purchase 
years would be considerably larger. On the other hand, the breakeven ratio during ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  63
the 1990s would likely be considerably lower if calculated using the Case-Shiller 
index, implying that homeownership was an even more attractive way to build 
household wealth than is implied in the analysis.
18The expectation of falling prices in 2010 reflects that through the third 
quarter of 2010, repeat-sales house price indexes are down by as much as 2.3 
percent from their level in late 2009.
19Partly dampening the upward movement of the stock-based breakeven ra-
tio is the crash in stock prices during 2008. As of late 2010, the S&P index value 
remains more than 20 percent below its December 2007 average. The relatively 
smaller decline in housing prices, as measured by the Freddie Mac index, may 
nevertheless outweigh the stock price decline because of the leverage associated 
with homeownership.
20Complementing a possible fall in the breakeven ratio is that the market rent-
to-price ratio rose sharply from 2006 to 2010. This simply reflects the fall in house 
prices over these years. Further contributing to the possibility that the breakeven 
ratio will fall below the range of plausible market ratios is that the upper and lower 
bounds on plausibility have risen sharply since 2006, reflecting the contraction in 
house prices. Hence the breakeven ratio need not be as low as in the past for home-
ownership to be the more effective way to build household wealth.
21This ambiguity does not imply that the comparison of the breakeven and 
range of plausible market ratios is uninformative. The stock-based breakeven ra-
tio in 1977 was 503, only slightly above the lower bound on plausibility. The 
lower a value within the plausible range, the more likely it is that the actual mar-
ket ratio will be above it. While it cannot be ruled out that the 1977 market ratio 
was less than 503, almost certainly it was higher.
22The period of rapid real house price growth, as measured by several repeat 
sales house price indexes, lasted from 1997 to 2006, with the fastest growth oc-
curring from 2001-05.
23For the present analysis, the growth of house prices is based on the Freddie 
Mac repeat sales house price index. The growth of rents is based on the owner 
equivalent rent (OER) component of the consumer price index. Both of these are 
“constant quality” in the sense that they are based on changes over time of the 
rent of the same house and the sales price of the same house. Additionally, the 
OER growth rate is based on changes in rents on renter-occupied houses that are 
averaged together using weights to match the average observed characteristics of 
owner-occupied houses.
24Correspondingly, a nominal $10 monthly difference between the market 
rent and the bond-based threshold rent on a median-priced house would have 
implied an average final wealth difference of $1,900 (nominal), with a range 
across occupancies of $1,500 to $2,400 (in absolute value). A nominal $10 
monthly difference between the market rent and the stock-based threshold rent 64  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
on a median-priced house would have implied an average final wealth difference 
of $2,400, with a range across occupancies of $1,200 to $3,200.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2010  65
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